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INTRODUCTION 
n 2017, the Trump Administration announced a proposal to 
expand leasing offshore areas for oil and gas development as part 
of President Trump’s America-First Offshore Energy Strategy.1 The 
proposal allows new offshore oil and gas drilling in almost all coastal 
areas in the United States, contradicting former President Barack 
Obama’s drilling ban.2 The colossal expansion will allow oil and gas 
companies to lease off California’s shores for the first time in decades 
and make available over one billion acres in the Arctic and Eastern 
Seaboard for potential oil and gas production.3 
Adverse environmental harm from the oil and gas development 
process is significant, and it increases in severity with every subsequent 
stage of the process.4 For example, during the survey period, high- 
intensity acoustic signals pulse through the ocean and sedimentary 
strata and affect surrounding aquatic life.5 Once potential oil sites are 
discovered, operators obtain drilling rights and commence exploratory 
drilling by dredging and filling coastal habitat to install rigs.6 When this 
drilling occurs, there is the potential for trace metals, hydrocarbons, 
and sediment to affect surrounding waters and aquatic life.7 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Department Advances America-First 
Offshore Energy Strategy (May 10, 2017). 
2 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2019–2024 NATIONAL OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM (2018) 1 [hereinafter DPP] 
(President Obama invoked obscure provision of a 1953 law in outer continental shelf land 
acts to block new lease sale in large areas of the Arctic and Atlantic.). 
3 See id. at 8. 
4 See Jerry M. Neff, Nancy N. Rabalais & Donald F. Boesch, Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development Activities Potentially Causing Long-Term Environmental Effects, in LONG-
TERM ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT, Table 4.1 at 
149, 151 (Donald F. Boesch & Nancy N. Rabalais eds., 1987). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 153. 
I 
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Accordingly, the increased potential for environmental harm through 
subsequent processes prohibits states from meaningfully opposing the 
oil and gas development until later in the development process. This is 
because courts interpret risks in earlier stages as too speculative to 
warrant analysis.8 This framework allows for increased state 
involvement as potential environmental harm to coasts becomes more 
concrete with site-specific analyses and development.9 This process is 
called “tiering,” which recurs in many of the statutory schemes that are 
discussed in this paper.10 
Increased understanding and recognition of harm that accompanies 
offshore oil and gas development have parties other than environmental 
advocates concerned. President Trump’s 2019–2024 National Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (DPP) 
has also activated opposition among coastal states, resulting in 
governors publicly opposing the expansion11 and various states’ 
attorneys general collectively signing a letter to the Department of the 
Interior in opposition.12 Though the former Secretary of the Interior, 
Ryan Zinke, sympathized with the Florida governor’s opposition by 
exempting the state from the proposal,13 this move left other coastal 
states of both major parties claiming political favoritism for not 
extending the same preference to them.14 Accordingly, 
environmentalists and states are searching for ways they can protect the 
coast’s natural integrity in order to increase tourism and maintain 
healthy ecosystems and quality-of-life.15 
8 See infra Parts III, IV (discussing state limitations at earlier stages in development). 
9 See infra Parts III, IV. 
10 See Environmental Operations Section (EOS), BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
https://www.boem.gov/about-boem/environmental-operations-section-eos 
[https://perma.cc/EV5F-NALQ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (“Tiering under NEPA refers to 
a more limited and site-specific environmental evaluation that is placed in our text beneath 
a broader environmental evaluation in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions.”). 
11 Coral Davenport, Florida Is Exempted from Coastal Drilling. Other States Ask, 
‘Why Not Us?,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/climate/ 
coastal-drilling-florida-exempt-zinke.html [https://perma.cc/CM3H-SAB9]. 
12 Letter from Attorneys General of Various States to Ryan Zinke, Secretary of the 
Interior (Feb. 1, 2018) (on file with Josh Stein, North Carolina Attorney General). 
13 Ryan Zinke (@SecretaryZinke), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://twitter. 
com/SecretaryZinke/status/950876846698180608 [https://perma.cc/SW9G-46MW]. 
14 See Oliver Milman, Coastal States to Trump: Why Is Florida Exempt from Drilling 
and Not Us?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2018/jan/10/trump-offshore-drilling-florida-ryan-zinke [https://perma.cc/G296-QJH2]. 
15 See Jeff Daniels, California Gov. Jerry Brown Moves to Block Trump on Offshore 
Drilling: ‘Not Here, Not Now,’ CNBC (Sept. 8, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
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This Article will analyze the opportunities for concerned coasts to 
oppose offshore oil and gas by exercising the powers reserved to the 
states throughout the phases of the process. It will discuss (1) the 
delineation of federal and state sovereignty over coastal waters and 
(2) the planning process and agency responsibilities in administering
offshore oil and gas development. Further, it will analyze state
opportunities to deter offshore oil and gas throughout (3) the leasing
process, (4) the exploration phase, and (5) the development and
production process. Finally, the Article will conclude with an analysis
on the defects of the process from a state perspective.
I 
FEDERAL AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER COASTAL WATERS 
This Article focuses on the exploration and development of mineral 
resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The United States 
defines the OCS as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of 
the area of lands beneath navigable waters . . . , and of which the subsoil 
and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”16 
A. History
The United States’ interest in jurisdiction over the OCS gained 
recognition shortly after World War II.17 The war demonstrated the 
growing importance of oil and gas resources and motivated the United 
States to expand definitions of freedom of access to the sea.18 
Accordingly, President Truman recognized the importance of 
advancing exploration and developing technology for offshore 
resource extraction and issued a proclamation claiming jurisdiction and 
control of oil and gas resources that underlie parts of the continental 
shelf off the nation’s coasts.19 The proclamation encouraged 
exploration and extraction of those resources and resolution of foreign 
2018/09/08/california-gov-brown-signs-legislation-to-block-new-offshore-drilling.html 
[https://perma.cc/U96W-YWXN]; see also Madeleine Carlisle, Trump’s Offshore-Drilling 
Plan Is Roiling Coastal Elections, ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2018/08/trumps-offshore-drilling-plan-is-roiling-coastal-elections/566726 
[https://perma.cc/A3PD-XM7L]. 
16 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
17 ALISON RIESER ET AL., OCEAN & COASTAL LAW 2–3 (West 4th ed. 2007). 
18 Id. 
19 See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945). 
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state conflicts of interest through equitable principles.20 However, the 
proclamation failed to address the interests of coastal states or include 
any provision addressing the extent of their ownership of offshore 
lands.21 
Several coastal states nevertheless claimed ownership and 
jurisdiction over the three miles that extend seaward from the low water 
mark under the equal footing doctrine.22 The equal footing doctrine is 
a judicially created doctrine that recognizes and grants newly admitted 
states the same rights and claims to ownership as the original thirteen 
colonies upon entering the union.23 Despite the general understanding 
of state ownership under the equal footing doctrine, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless upheld President Truman’s proclamation: “The United 
States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, 
possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, 
the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying 
seaward of the ordinary low-water mark . . . .”24 
To alleviate the tensions between federal and state governments, 
Congress clarified the jurisdictional framework of state and federal 
control over resources in its Submerged Lands Act in 1953.25 The Act 
recognized state ownership of the first three miles extending seaward 
from the low-water mark.26 However, Congress allowed Texas and 
Florida to claim ownership of three marine leagues27 from the shoreline 
because Congress had previously approved the increased boundary at 
the time the states joined the Union.28 
Concurrently with the Submerged Lands Act, Congress passed the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),29 which granted the 
United States jurisdiction, control, and power over the subsoil and 
20 Id. 
21 See id. 
22 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29–30 (1947); see also United States v. 
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 703 (1950). 
23 California, 332 U.S. at 29–30. 
24 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947). 
25 See generally 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–15 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
26 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312. 
27 “A unit of length used in marine navigation that is equal to a minute of arc of a great 
circle on a sphere. One international nautical mile is equivalent to 1,852 meters or 1.151 
[statute] miles.” Nautical Miles, METRIC CONVERSION, https://www.metric-conversions. 
org/length/nautical-leagues-to-us-nautical-miles.htm [https://perma.cc/YW6F-CLQ2] (last 
updated July 22, 2018). 
28 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 29 (1960). 
29 See generally 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1356 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
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seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, subject to environmental 
safeguards and navigational principals.30 
In response to the fluctuating territorial standards of coastal nations, 
the United Nations negotiated a consistent law of coastal states at its 
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.31 Though some coastal 
law became customary, such as the two-hundred-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the twelve-mile territorial sea boundary, the 
Convention sought to define these basic principles in the international 
law of the sea.32 
Among other provisions, the Convention addressed and defined 
various limits including the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
EEZ, and continental shelf limits.33 At the Convention, the U.N. 
determined that every coastal nation has a right to establish (1) a 
territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles;34 (2) a “contiguous zone” not 
to exceed twelve miles, which allows coastal states to exercise control 
as necessary to enforce their “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations within [their] territory” and punish infringement 
of those laws;35 and an EEZ not to extend beyond two hundred nautical 
miles.36 The Convention provided a global understanding of the 
geographical extent of nations’ jurisdiction and control off adjacent 
shorelines.37 Accordingly, a year later, President Ronald Reagan issued 
a proclamation adopting and establishing a two-hundred-mile EEZ 
adjacent to the United States coast.38 The establishment of the EEZ 
provided coastal states and the federal government the ability to 
exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seabed and 
subsoil. It also established jurisdiction over artificial islands and 
30 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332. 
31 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 29. 
32 Id. 
33 See U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, Part V, art. 57, (1982), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/unclos/closindx.htm [https://perma.cc/8X5Y-WTCZ] [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
34 Id. at Part II, art. 3. 
35 Id. at Part II, art. 33. 
36 Id. at Part V, art. 57. 
37 Tommy T.B. Koh (President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea), A Constitution for the Oceans, at xxxiii (Dec. 11, 1982), https://www.un.org/depts/ 
los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PRN-G5JX] (“The 
Convention will promote the maintenance of international peace and security because it will 
replace a plethora of conflicting claims by coastal States with universally agreed limits on 
the territorial sea, on the contiguous zone, on the exclusive economic zone and on the 
continental shelf.”). 
38 Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
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structures within the zone.39 Thus, the federal government has 
exclusive control and jurisdiction to manage submerged lands up to two 
hundred miles beyond the states’ three-mile territory in accordance 
with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.40 
B. Statutory Schemes in Outer Continental Shelf Lands Oil and
Gas Development 
1. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The OCSLA41 grants the United States “jurisdiction, control,
and power” over the subsoil and seabed of the OCS, subject to 
environmental safeguards and navigational principals.42 In 1978, 
Congress amended the Act to create a four-stage leasing program 
consisting of (1) planning, (2) leasing, (3) exploration, and 
(4) development and production.43 However, the Act still left
ambiguity regarding the outer limits of the federal government’s
control and jurisdiction.
The Secretary of the Interior is the principal manager of OCS 
resources and must primarily manage them within the bounds of 
OCSLA.44 OCLSA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease land 
on the OCS for energy development and to regulate the leasing 
process.45 In 2005, the Energy Policy Act amended OCSLA to grant 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) lead management 
authority for energy projects on federal offshore lands and any projects 
that make alternative uses of existing oil and natural gas platforms.46 
Prior to BOEM’s management of the OCS, the Minerals Management 
Service held authority to manage OCS lands. However, due to the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, compounded with internal dysfunction, 
39 Id. 
40 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see also Shell 
Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1288–89 (9th Cir. 2013). 
41 See generally 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1356 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
42 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(1)–(3). 
43 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 397. 
44 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (granting the Secretary of the Interior with primary 
authority in administering leases). 
45 See id. 
46 See Antony C. Marino & C. Jacob Gower, Oil and Gas Mineral Leasing and 
Development on the Outer Continental Shelf of the United States, 4 LA. ST. U. J. ENERGY 
L. & RESOURCES 1, 10 (2015).
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the recent Energy Policy Act delegated primary oversight and 
management responsibilities to BOEM.47 
Currently, BOEM is operating under the 2017–2022 National OCS 
Program established by the Obama Administration.48 The 2017–2022 
National OCS Program allows “11 potential lease sales in four planning 
areas—10 sales in portions of three Gulf of Mexico program areas that 
are not under moratorium and one sale offshore Alaska in the Cook 
Inlet program area.”49 
2. The National Environmental Policy Act
Another statutory scheme governing management of offshore oil
and gas resources lies in the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process. NEPA is a procedural statute that requires federal 
agencies to prepare a report considering environmental impacts of a 
proposed project for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.”50 Though NEPA does not impose 
substantive requirements, it mandates that all federal agencies 
engaging in major federal actions that significantly affect “the quality 
of the human environment” prepare a report51 that generally comes in 
the form of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).52 NEPA 
requires the EIS to include specific provisions in its analysis: 
(i)  the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii)  any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
47 Id.; see also Fact Sheet, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/ 
sites/default/files/boem-newsroom/BOEM-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBD5-L7WU] 
(last updated Feb. 2018). 
48 See Record of Decision Memorandum from Walter D. Cruickshank, Acting Dir., 
BOEM, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y of the Interior (Jan. 17, 2017) (on file with BOEM). 
49 Nick Snow, DOI Cuts Most Alaska Tracts in Latest 2017-22 OCS Leasing-Plan Move, 
OIL & GAS J. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/11/doi-cuts-most-alaska-
tracts-in-latest-2017-22-ocs-leasing-plan-move.html [https://perma.cc/C4SJ-44LP]. 
50 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
51 Id. 
52 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2019) (“Environmental impact statement means a detailed 
written statement as required by section 102(2)(C) of the Act.”). 
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(v)  any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.53
The Secretary of the Interior and BOEM must comply with NEPA 
as well as OCSLA because BOEM is a federal agency and offshore oil 
and gas activities constitute an action “that might significantly affect 
the quality of the human environment.”54 Thus, BOEM, or an applicant 
seeking authorization from BOEM to engage in such activities, must 
prepare a report analyzing the environmental impact of the proposed 
action. 
3. The Coastal Zone Management Act
Though states opposing offshore oil and gas development are unable
to prohibit OCS development outright, OCSLA requires the federal 
government to consider state and tribal concerns and provide them an 
opportunity to participate in planning decisions through the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (CZMA).55 Though seemingly empowering for 
states, the CZMA is similar to other OCS statutory schemes in that it 
often fails to provide states a significant role in the planning process or 
to prohibit the development of offshore oil and gas.56 
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 aims “to preserve, 
protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the 
resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and succeeding 
generations” and “to encourage and assist states to exercise effectively 
their responsibilities in the coastal zone.”57 The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce 
administers the CZMA processes and its requirements.58 
Congress recognized that this type of land-use planning and 
management was traditionally a realm of jurisdiction belonging to the 
states.59 Accordingly, it aimed to create a cooperative federalism model 
of coastal management by providing federal funding to states that 
53 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
54 Jennifer Kilanski, Overview of BOEM Environmental Review Process, BUREAU 
OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. (Aug. 2010), https://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/ 
State-Activities/EnvironmentalPresentation.aspx [https://perma.cc/48PR-DQWL]. 
55 See generally 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1465 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
56 See Jonathan Schirmer, Are We Out of the Woods Yet? Arctic Leasing Reform in the 
Trump Administration, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 673, 685–86 (2018). 
57 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(1)–(2). 
58 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 250. 
59 Id. 
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developed a plan to achieve costal management goals.60 Specifically, it 
increases state management of coastal areas by providing states an 
incentive to voluntarily create coastal management plans that “give[] 
full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values” 
as well as economic development.61 
More importantly, the CZMA provides that coastal zone 
management plans may effectively give rise to a limited waiver of 
federal supremacy in accordance with the “consistency provision” of 
the Act.62 The consistency provision requires federal agencies to carry 
out a “consistency review” to ensure that their actions conform to the 
state’s federally approved management plan.63 NOAA regulations 
provide that federal agencies “shall consider the enforceable policies of 
management programs as requirements to be adhered to in addition to 
existing Federal agency statutory mandates” whenever it is legally 
permissible.64 However, the Secretary of the Interior may override the 
state’s determination of consistency or continue the project despite the 
inconsistency if it is necessary to protect national security interests.65 
Thus, federal actions seemingly must adhere to state coastal zone 
management plans unless doing so would be unlawful. 
However, even the consistency provision is not absolute regarding 
states’ ability to prevent federal oil and gas development by banning 
exploration and development in their respective coastal management 
plans. Both an increased demand for oil and weakening court 
interpretations significantly reduced the effectiveness of states’ role in 
OCS development decisions. 
Accordingly, Congress amended the Act in 1976 in response to the 
Arab oil embargo and consequent 1973–1974 energy crisis, which 
made energy independence a primary political objective.66 The main 
blow to states’ ability to deter offshore oil and gas came in the form of 
the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP), which established a ten-
year program to provide financial assistance to coastal states that 
federal offshore oil and gas programs may affect.67 The program 
60 Id. 
61 § 1452(2). 
62 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
63 § 1456(c)(1)(C) (“Each Federal agency carrying out an activity subject to paragraph 
(1) shall provide a consistency determination to the relevant State agency . . . .”).
64 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a)(1)–(2) (2019).
65 § 1456(3)(A).
66 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 252–53.
67 Id. at 253.
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contains three parts that provide grants and loans to assist states in 
granting money to offset negative effects of OCS developments.68 
Congress further amended the Act in 1980 to emphasize the nation’s 
concern with energy independence.69 The amendments conditioned 
administrative grants to states based on the presence of coastal energy 
siting and government facilities in its plan.70 Though the imposition of 
these requirements on states has generally been upheld, Courts have 
relaxed the requirement so that conditioning and guiding offshore oil 
processes, without an inflexible commitment to potential oil sites in a 
zoning map, is sufficient for adequate energy facility siting.71 
With state coastal zone management plan requirements in mind, the 
prominent inquiry is whether states can effectively use the plan to deter 
federal offshore oil and gas projects. The state coastal management 
plans control only up to the bounds of the territorial sea—that is, three 
miles seaward from the state’s coastline.72 Accordingly, courts have 
examined states’ ability to enjoin a federal action outside their territory 
that nevertheless affects the coast and consequently results in the 
action’s inconsistency with a coastal management plan.73 
4. Judicial Review Under Statutory Schemes
NEPA, CZMA, and OCSLA do not provide a private right of action
for substantive claims and thus must seek judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA provides judicial 
review for a final agency action that resulted in legal harm where there 
is no other adequate remedy in a court.74 In addition, a successful claim 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 254. 
70 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455(d)(2)(H) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
71 See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 919 (C.D. Cal. 1978) 
(“Congress never intended that . . . a management program must provide a ‘zoning map’ . . . 
[n]or did Congress intend . . . to require such programs establish such detailed criteria that
private users be able to rely on them as predictive devices for determining the fate of projects
without interaction between the relevant state agencies and the user.”).
72 NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
SO WHAT? COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT BOUNDARY, https://www.marinecadastre. 
gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/SoWhat_CZMBoundary_final_template.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/6QUV-ACFS] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (“On the water side, the management area 
includes all state waters as determined under the Submerged Lands Act. This is three 
nautical miles from shore for the ocean states and territories . . . .”). 
73 Compare Sec’y of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984), with California v. 
Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002). 
74 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702, 704 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
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under the APA can result in a court compelling an “agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” or “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”75 
However, the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and 
difficult to overcome due to the high deference that courts give to 
agencies.76 Accordingly, a court may not “substitute its own judgement 
for that of the agency—rather, it must cautiously review the 
administrative record to ensure that the agency has derived a reasoned 
judgement from the consideration and application of all pertinent 
factors.”77 An arbitrary and capricious standard applies when 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or [its decision] is so implausible that 
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.78 
Thus, the narrow judicial review of agency decisions limits states’ 
ability to challenge federal actions on the basis of the extent of harm 
the project will cause to a state’s coastline. 
II 
PLANNING STAGE 
With the understanding of federal and state jurisdiction in coastal 
waters, this next section describes the federal government’s process for 
proposing oil and gas leases and administering agencies’ 
responsibilities. Throughout the planning process, BOEM adheres to 
several statutory schemes that strive to increase state participation. 
However, court interpretations and agency policies have diluted the 
states’ role in the process to render their participation as merely 
75 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(1)–(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
76 Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. 
REV. 289, 298 (2002) (“Once a court reads a gap in a statute to constitute an implied 
delegation of decisionmaking authority by Congress to an agency, the court will rarely, if 
ever, reject the agency’s decision as impermissible or arbitrary and capricious.”). 
77 Blanco v. Burton, No. CIV.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 
2006); see Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992). 
78 La. Envtl. Action Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 382 F.3d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 161 F.3d 923, 934 (5th 
Cir. 1998)). 
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“symbolic.”79 Nevertheless, OCSLA, NEPA, and the CZMA all require 
state participation throughout the OCS development process, which 
gives states the opportunity to raise their concerns and provide input in 
OCS oil and gas development. 
A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Under OCSLA, BOEM must prepare a five-year program that 
includes a schedule of proposed oil and gas lease sales in federal waters 
that would presumably meet national energy demands following 
program approval.80 Preparing the five-year program begins with 
BOEM filing a request for information in the Federal Register to allow 
states, local governments, industries, and federal agencies to submit 
comments.81 Additionally, BOEM must directly contact affected states’ 
governors to “identify specific laws, goals, and policies which they 
believe should be considered . . . in connection with the leasing 
program.”82 Once the preliminary scoping is completed, BOEM will 
prepare a draft proposed program that will be forwarded to affected 
states’ governors and subsequently publish the draft program in the 
Federal Register.83 
The Act includes substantive requirements and a series of factors 
that BOEM must consider in preparing its five-year program.84 These 
factors include geographical and ecological characteristics of the 
planning areas, the environmental risk and relative benefit from OCS 
development, the location in relation to energy market needs and use 
of the seabed, and the laws and policies of affected states.85 An issuance 
of the draft proposed program is preceded and followed by a comment 
period that allows for public input.86 
This comment period allows concerned parties to comment on any 
part of the five-year plan.87 Generally, coastal states have a particular 
interest in this stage of the process because they have an opportunity to 
79 Schirmer, supra note 56, at 685. 
80 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
81 30 C.F.R. § 556.16(a) (2012). 
82 § 556.16(b). 
83 30 C.F.R. § 556.17(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
84 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a)(2). 
85 Id. 
86 § 1344(c)–(d). 
87 Id.; Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer 
Continental Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 75, 92 (1992). 
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exclude certain geographic areas from the five-year program.88 
Additionally, states have used this opportunity to request additional 
research or mitigation measures in areas that are proposed to be 
leased.89 
Generally, state actions under OCSLA for judicial review of a five-
year plan are not successful.90 Courts consistently give wide discretion 
to a Secretary of the Interior’s determinations under the five-year 
plan.91 Moreover, courts reason that because the purpose of OCSLA is 
“the expeditious development of OCS resources,” other factors that the 
Act requires the Secretary to consider, such as environmental damage 
and potential for adverse impact, need not be weighed equally.92 As 
long as the Secretary of the Interior “considered” state concerns and 
provided an explanation that is sufficient to permit the state to 
understand the basis for the rejection, the Secretary has no obligation 
to adhere to state concerns or recommendations.93 Thus, the Secretary 
essentially has exclusive control over oil and gas development in the 
planning stage. Consequently, because a Secretary’s decision will be 
overturned only if he exercised a “clear error of judgement,” actions 
under the leasing stage will likely not be successful.94 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
As previously mentioned, BOEM must also comply with NEPA.95 
Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 to “encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment” by establishing 
a procedural process by which federal actions that significantly affect 
88 Wiygul, supra note 87, at 92–93. 
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., California v. Watt (Watt I), 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981); California v. 
Watt (Watt II), 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 
F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
91 See, e.g., Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1290; Watt II, 712 F.2d at 584; Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 865 F.2d at 288. 
92 See Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1316. 
93 Id. at 1321–22. 
94 Id. at 1317 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971)). 
95 Environmental Assessment, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem. 
gov/Environmental-Assessment-Division [https://perma.cc/6RFL-9NZY] (last visited Feb. 
19, 2020) (“BOEM prepares National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents and 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act reports; provides oversight, policy guidance, and 
direction for NEPA and other environmental laws and regulations affecting OCS activities 
. . . .”). 
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the environmental quality must adhere before initiating a project.96 
Accordingly, the procedural act requires the Secretary of the Interior to 
prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) that 
includes an overview of possible environmental harm resulting from 
the five-year program.97 
Unlike lease-specific EISs, the PEIS identifies areas, resources, and 
activities that have the potential to create significant environmental 
impact with a focus on “breadth” rather than “depth.”98 The 
discrepancy in the analyses’ level of specificity is emblematic of the 
“tiering” framework. Tiering allows for a broad Environmental Impact 
Statement to cover large projects. Subsequently, agencies must prepare 
an additional specific, narrower analysis for site-specific projects, 
projects of a lesser scope, or multistaged projects that require 
supplemental analysis.99 
Consequently, NEPA plays a more substantial role in OCS 
development in the leasing portion of the process, which this Article 
will address in more detail in the next section. Under NEPA, BOEM 
need only file a Notice of Intent to prepare a PEIS at the time the Draft 
Proposed Program is filed.100 Thereafter, BOEM must publish the draft 
PEIS in the Federal Register followed by a comment period.101 
The Trump Administration submitted a new proposed five-year 
lease schedule for 2019–2024 on January 4, 2018, which is progressing 
toward displacing the current proposal.102 In contrast to Obama-era 
policies, the new proposal includes forty-seven potential lease sales: 
“19 sales off the coast of Alaska, 7 in the Pacific Region, 12 in the Gulf 
of Mexico, and 9 in the Atlantic Region.”103 To date, this proposal 
96 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
97 Marino & Gower, supra note 46, at 13. 
98 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
99 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (2019). 
100 See Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the 2019–2024 National 
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
https://www.boem.gov/National-Program-Learn/#peis [https://perma.cc/874D-UZK5] (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
101 Id. 
102 See generally DPP, supra note 2. 
103 Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Zinke Announces Plan for Unleashing 
America’s Offshore Oil and Gas Potential (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.doi.gov/ 
pressreleases/secretary-zinke-announces-plan-unleashing-americas-offshore-oil-and-gas-
potential [https://perma.cc/PY2V-4BKG]. 
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comprises the largest number of lease sales ever proposed for the 
National OCS Program’s five-year lease schedule.104 
Furthermore, the Trump Administration published a Notice of Intent 
to prepare an EIS for its proposed five-year lease schedule concurrently 
with the Draft Proposed Program (DPP) on January 8, 2017, in the 
Federal Register.105 The comment period for both the DPP and the 
Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS concluded on March 9, 2018, with 
over two million comment submissions.106 Subsequently, the Secretary 
of the Interior will publish its final proposed program under OCSLA 
and its draft EIS under NEPA. 
III 
LEASING STAGE 
Once BOEM establishes its final draft for a five-year program, it 
can begin leasing planning areas for development. This process begins 
with BOEM publishing “Calls for Information and Nominations” in 
the Federal Register, which invites input on what areas it should 
lease.107 Once BOEM considers submitted comments and makes its 
determination, it will recommend “areas identified for environmental 
analysis and consideration for leasing” to the Secretary of the 
Interior.108 Subsequently, BOEM will forward a proposed notice of 
sale, following the Secretary of the Interior’s approval, to the governor 
of any affected state.109 
At this stage in the process, OCSLA provides affected states an 
opportunity to offer comments regarding the size, timing, and location 
of the proposed lease sale.110 Though the Secretary of the Interior may 
consider local governments’ concerns and suggestions, the Secretary 
of the Interior must follow the governor’s recommendations if the 
104 Id. (“This is the largest number of lease sales ever proposed for the National OCS 
Program’s 5-year lease schedule.”). 
105 Notice of Availability of the 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Leasing Program and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement, 83 Fed. Reg. 829 (Jan. 8, 2018). 
106 Notice of Availability (NOA) of the 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Leasing Program and Notice of Intent (NOI) to Prepare a 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www. 
regulations.gov/docket?D=BOEM-2017-0074 [https://perma.cc/3N9H-7C2X] (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2020). 
107 See 30 C.F.R. § 556.23(b) (2019). 
108 30 C.F.R. § 556.26(a) (2019). 
109 30 C.F.R. § 556.29 (2019). 
110 30 C.F.R. § 556.31 (2019). 
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recommendation achieves a “reasonable balance between the National 
interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State.”111 
Subsequently, BOEM will publish the proposed notice of sale, 
followed by a comment period.112 Once BOEM considers and 
incorporates comments as necessary, it will publish a notice of sale, 
which includes the terms and conditions of sale, in the Federal 
Register.113 
Throughout the leasing and sale process, the Secretary of the Interior 
must also comply with requirements under the CZMA, NEPA, and 
OCSLA to ensure that states and the interested public have 
opportunities to intervene.114 
A. The Coastal Zone Management Act
In contrast with the planning stage, states have much more ability 
and control over the leasing stage under the CZMA. Though court 
interpretations initially deterred states’ ability to push back on federal 
OCS development, subsequent amendments strengthened the role of 
state participation in the leasing stage. 
Initial challenges to halt OCS development at the leasing stage were 
unsuccessful.115 The Supreme Court held that the consistency provision 
was unavailable in the leasing stage because it triggered only a limited 
preliminary activity that did not “directly affect” the state’s coastline.116 
Thus, the state could challenge only offshore oil and gas development 
under the consistency provision at the time specific exploration plans 
or development and production plans were submitted for federal 
approval.117 
Shortly thereafter, the 1990 amendments to the CZMA emboldened 
California to attempt enforcing adherence to its management plan 
through the consistency provision.118 The 1990 amendments essentially 
overruled previous cases by removing “directly” from “directly 
affects” and thus expanded the circumstances where the consistency 
111 § 556.31(b). 
112 30 C.F.R. § 556.32 (2019). 
113 Id. 
114 BOEM Governing Statutes, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem. 
gov/Governing-Statutes [https://perma.cc/6XT6-CFBB] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
115 See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 338 (1984). 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 See California v. Norton, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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provision applies. Accordingly, the 1990 amendments require federal 
agencies to find their activities are consistent with a state’s 
management plan if such activity “affects” a state’s coastline, removing 
the need to show the activity “directly affects” the coastline.119 Indeed, 
Congress enacted the Act with the intent to clarify that offshore oil and 
gas projects are subject to the CZMA consistency determinations.120 
Accordingly, a leasing entity must provide the state with a consistency 
determination that assures the significant decision to extend the life of 
oil exploration and production is consistent with the state’s coastal zone 
management program.121 
After the 1990 amendments passed, the Trump Administration’s 
leasing plan would seemingly be unable to proceed in states that have 
a moratorium on offshore oil and gas. However, the courts have not 
recognized the consistency provision as a veto power, and in 2006, the 
Bush administration amended the CZMA: 
[I]n all foreseeable instances, lease suspensions would not be subject
to federal consistency review since (1) in general, they do not
authorize activities with coastal effects, and (2) if they did contain
activities with coastal effects, the activities and coastal effects would
be covered in a State’s review of a previous lease sale, an EP or a
DPP.122
This regulation runs counter to the 1990 amendments, which allow 
states to demand an early consistency review where “future, indirect 
effects shall be considered in the context of a proposed federal 
activity.”123 However, the regulations may force the courts to analyze 
Congress’s intent to determine if the regulations are similar to the Act 
itself.124 Nevertheless, states still have considerable ability to enforce 
their consistency provision in the subsequent exploration or 
development and production stages. 
119 Linda Krop, Defending State’s Rights Under the Coastal Zone Management Act—
State of California v. Norton, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 54, 56 (2007). 
120 Norton, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
121 Norton, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1054; see also Patrick B. Sanders, Blanco v. Burton: 
Louisiana’s Struggle for Cooperative Federalism in Offshore Energy Development, 69 LA. 
L. REV. 255, 270–74 (2008) (describing case where the Court held the MMS unlawfully
failed to comply with State CZP in violation of the CZMA’s consistency determination and
encouraged a settlement agreement).
122 Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Consistency Regulations, Final Rule, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 788, 792 (Jan. 5, 2006). 
123 Krop, supra note 119, at 58. 
124 Id. 
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B. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Though OCSLA serves as a procedural statute in guiding the leasing 
process, it also includes substantive requirements regarding the 
consideration of state recommendations.125 Drafters of the Act required 
federal entities to “insure that Governors of affected States, and local 
government executives within such States, have a leading role in OCS 
decisions and particularly as to potential lease sales and development 
and production plans.”126 These requirements usually become 
actionable in the exploration and development stages of OCS 
development because they have significant impacts on coastal states.127 
Specifically, OCSLA states that “the Secretary [of the Interior] shall 
accept recommendations of the Governor . . . if he determines, after 
having provided the opportunity for consultation, that they provide for 
a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being 
of the citizens of the affected State.”128 Accordingly, the Secretary may 
decide not to accept the governor’s recommendations if they do not 
strike a reasonable balance between the national and individual states’ 
interests.129 Moreover, a Secretary’s rejection of a governor’s 
recommendation is final and not a basis for judicial review or enjoining 
a lease sale.130 Thus, despite the powerful language that mandates 
federal activities to adhere to state recommendations, the Act’s 
requirements are generally not effective in giving states an opportunity 
to voice concerns and participate in OCS development decisions. 
Courts have consistently upheld rejections of state input despite the 
statute’s clear language.131 Generally, courts give enormous deference 
to the Secretary to reject state plans in the leasing stage as long as the 
Secretary’s determination is not arbitrary or capricious.132 States have 
challenged a Secretary’s rejection of governors’ recommendations at 
125 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
126 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-590 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1558. 
127 Schirmer, supra note 56, at 687. 
128 43 U.S.C.A. § 1345(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
129 § 1345(c)–(d). 
130 § 1345(d). 
131 See California v. Watt (Watt III), 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); cf. Foundation v. 
Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (Watt IV) (D. Mass. 1983), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 
716 F.2d 946 (Watt V) (1st Cir. 1983); Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Mass. 
1984). 
132 See Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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the leasing stage several times with varying interpretations.133 The 
Ninth Circuit seems to downplay the binding nature of the governor’s 
recommendations on federal actions, allowing the Secretary to easily 
reject the governor’s recommendation.134 In contrast, Massachusetts 
courts emphasize that the Secretary “must accept the Governor’s 
recommendations unless he finds the recommendations do not provide 
a ‘reasonable balance’ between the national interest embodied in 
OCSLA and the well-being of the citizens of the Commonwealth.”135 
Thus, the requirement to adhere to governor recommendations gives 
states some utility to raise concerns to the Secretary of the Interior, 
though they are unable to enforce them.136 Generally, however, courts 
will not overturn a Secretary’s determination to reject the governor’s 
recommendations at the leasing stage.137 
C. The National Environmental Policy Act
Though NEPA plays a role in the leasing stage, the tiering 
framework relaxes the specificity required in a NEPA analysis at the 
leasing stage and consequently inhibits states’ ability to seek relief 
under NEPA.138 Interestingly, only one provision within OCLSA 
requires a NEPA analysis, and it is located in the development and 
production plans section of the Act.139 Regardless of OCSLA’s silence 
on the necessity of a NEPA analysis in the leasing stage, the analysis is 
required by implication prior to any lease sale due to the anticipated 
impacts the sale would have on the environment.140 Consequently, once 
BOEM publishes the notice of lease sale in the Federal Register, 
BOEM must prepare an EIS for the proposed planning areas.141 
However, in multistage leasing programs, “[the] obligation to fully 
comply with NEPA do[es] not mature until leases are issued,” because 
133 See id.; see also Watt III, 683 F.2d at 1253, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
California, 464 U.S. at 312; cf. Watt IV, 560 F. Supp. at 561, aff’d sub nom. Watt V, 716 
F.2d at 946; Massachusetts, 594 F. Supp. at 1373.
134 See Tribal Vill. of Akutan, 869 F.2d at 1190; Watt III, 683 F.2d at 1253.
135 Massachusetts, 594 F. Supp. at 1387.
136 Wiygul, supra note 87, at 114–15.
137 Id. at 114.
138 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (2019).
139 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 400; see also 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(e)(1) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
140 RIESER ET AL., supra note 17, at 400; see also 43 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
141 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (2019). 
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only at that point has there been an “irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment of resources.”142 
Thus, the EIS need not fully comply with statutory requirements 
under NEPA at the leasing stage. However, unlike the PEIS undertaken 
in the planning process, the EIS in the leasing process is comparatively 
more thorough and specifically requires assessing environmental 
impacts on a “fine geographic scale,” including alternatives to the 
proposed action and potential mitigation measures.143 In addition, the 
EIS must consider the direct effects of leasing and cumulatively 
“consider the environmental impact of future exploration and 
development activity in preparing environmental analyses in 
conjunction with the [leases] in this case.”144 
However, despite the incremental increase in EIS specificity and 
completeness at the leasing stage, the analysis still does not require a 
level of stringency that provides states the ability to challenge an EIS’s 
completeness under NEPA. The lax requirement at the leasing stage is 
problematic because it is the last opportunity to review the cumulative 
environmental impacts of the leasing area as a whole.145 Similar to the 
planning stage, courts generally adhere to the tiering rationale and 
allow federal agencies to omit information about adverse effects to 
specific species in the leasing area in reliance that the effects will be 
analyzed at a site-specific level in subsequent processes.146 
Furthermore, due to the Act’s overall procedural nature, even a 
successful NEPA action can deter offshore oil and gas only to the 
extent that requiring a revision of the analysis could render OCS 
development less attractive and thus influence an agency’s final 
decision.147 
142 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 480 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143 Marino & Gower, supra note 46, at 15. 
144 League for Coastal Prot. v. Norton, No. C 05-0991 CW, 2005 WL 2176910, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2005). 
145 M. David Kurtz, Managing Alaska’s Coastal Development: State Review of Federal 
Oil and Gas Lease Sales, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 377, 398 (1994) (“The paramount importance 
of the lease sale stage emanates from the fact that it is the only opportunity to review the 
entire lease sale area as a whole.”). 
146 See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2014) (“missing 
information from the FEIS and SEIS is not ‘essential’ to informed decision-making at the 
lease sale stage”). 
147 Schirmer, supra note 56, at 689. 
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For example, Massachusetts prevailed in its NEPA claim on an 
EIS’s inadequacy because the EIS covered twenty-five million acres, 
which was too large an area to be adequately site specific.148 Thus, the 
court held the geographic scale considered in the analysis would 
“dilute” necessary protective measures and potential harms.149 
Furthermore, the court found that when the initial twenty-five-million-
acre project area that was originally proposed was substantially 
reduced, the change in scale rendered the EIS insufficient because it 
was no longer representative of the sale that could legally occur.150 
However, the judgment on the NEPA claim did not enjoin offshore oil 
and gas development, rather, the judgment required federal agencies to 
reconduct their analysis on a smaller geographic scale. 
D. The Endangered Species Act
BOEM must operate within the bounds of federal law in the 
development of offshore oil and gas.151 Accordingly, BOEM must 
ensure that OCS oil and gas development complies with federal acts 
such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.152 Among these federal 
acts, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides states the ability to 
challenge OCS development if it would jeopardize an endangered or 
threatened species.153 
BOEM is responsible for adhering to the ESA throughout the OCS 
development process.154 Yet, in the development process, the oil and 
gas operators are beginning to drill, and BOEM is no longer the primary 
actor in the OCS.155 Consequently, BOEM must ensure that the 
development that would foreseeably result from the lease and sale “is 
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of [critical] habitat.”156 
148 See Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (D. Mass. 1984). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1381. 
151 BOEM Governing Statutes, supra note 114. 
152 Id. 
153 See, e.g., Oceana v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 37 F. Supp. 3d 147, 174 (D.D.C. 
2014) (case challenging BOEM’s actions for failure to comply with the Endangered Species 
Act). 
154 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
155 See Kurtz, supra note 145, at 381 (“The lessee must provide further environmental 
reports explaining any planned exploration or development activities once the lease is 
sold.”). 
156 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2). 
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Like other federal agencies, BOEM must consult with the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service.157 The 
consulted federal agency will then issue a biological opinion, which 
identifies potential effects of the federal action on the endangered 
species and provides alternatives to the proposed action to avoid harm 
to the species.158 Furthermore, the agency must not make an 
“irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.”159 
Once again, the “tiering” principle essentially bars successful ESA 
claims at the leasing stage. A lease sale will generally not violate the 
ESA because the granting of a lease does not constitute an “irreversible 
or irretrievable commitment of resources.”160 Thus, a challenge under 
the ESA would likely be more effective in the development process 
because many endangered species are at a greater risk with 




Generally, during the exploration phase, the ability to rely on 
documents in previous stages using the “tiering” principle combined 
with an agency’s heavy deference severely inhibit states’ ability to halt 
development at this stage.162 Though challenges at this stage may delay 
drilling activities, this Article’s research failed to identify any drilling 
project that agencies or courts canceled due to egregious environmental 
harm that would result. Accordingly, this section will provide a brief 
discussion of OCSLA, NEPA, the ESA, and the CZMA’s role in the 
exploration stage without providing an in-depth analysis of legal claims 
that are technically available. 
157 See id. 
158 See § 1536(a)(3). 
159 § 1536(d). 
160 See Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714–15 (1st Cir. 1979); Vill. 
of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1984); Defs. of Wildlife v. BOEM, 871 
F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1326–27 (S.D. Ala. 2012).
161 See Wiygul, supra note 87, at 122.
162 See, e.g., Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“BOEM’s decision that Shell’s exploration plan complied with OCSLA’s requirements is 
entitled to deference and is supported by the record as a whole.”). 
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A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
OCSLA guides the exploration stage of the OCS development and 
requires an operator preparing to drill wells on an OCS lease to submit 
an exploration plan (EP).163 An EP is a detailed report that requires 
documentation of the flora and fauna of environmentally sensitive areas 
within the project area; a description of the drilling program; an Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan; a description of the onshore support facilities 
required; and a projection of air pollutant emissions resulting from the 
project.164 
Once an applicant completes an EP, it must submit the EP to BOEM 
to review the submission and either identify problems and deficiencies 
or deem the plan submitted.165 However, BOEM can reject an EP only 
if it would “probably cause serious harm or damage to life” and can 
modify an EP only if it conflicts with OCSLA or its regulations, which 
provides BOEM great latitude in approving EPs.166 Though interested 
parties may challenge BOEM’s determination to approve, modify, or 
disapprove an EP,167 the deferential standard has only delayed—but not 
denied—an applicant’s ability to implement its EP.168 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
The approval or disapproval of an EP is a “major federal action” that 
attaches NEPA and ESA requirements.169 Regardless, until 2012, EPs 
qualified for a categorical exclusion under NEPA, removing the 
requirement for applicants to prepare an analysis of environmental 
impacts.170 However, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 prompted 
reorganization in the Act’s administration;171 under the new structure, 
163 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
164 30 C.F.R. § 250.33(a)–(b) (1997) (The Gulf of Mexico region is exempted from the 
requirement to describe the required onshore support facilities.). 
165 30 C.F.R. § 550.231 (2019). 
166 § 250.33(i)(3). 
167 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(c)(2)–(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
168 Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (“BOEM’s 
decision that Shell’s exploration plan complied with OCSLA’s requirements is entitled to 
deference and is supported by the record as a whole.”). 
169 See Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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BOEM was responsible for approving EPs and the Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) had authority to review oil 
spill contingency plans.172 Importantly, the reorganization expressly 
conditioned EP approval on the receipt of an environmental analysis 
under NEPA.173 
Despite the imposition of NEPA requirements, the tiering 
framework combined with agency deference renders challenges under 
NEPA at the exploration stage largely unsuccessful. The inapplicability 
of NEPA predominately arises from the “rule of reason” that relieves 
agencies from preparing a full EIS for federal actions that arise from 
nondiscretionary duties.174 In determining applicable NEPA 
requirements for Oil Spill Contingency Plans, courts recognize BSEE’s 
approval of an Oil Spill Contingency plan as a nondiscretionary duty 
because BSEE must approve the plan upon a finding it meets OCSLA’s 
requirements.175 Accordingly, the preparation of a NEPA analysis 
when preparing an EP “would merely ‘require an agency to prepare a 
full EIS due to the environmental impact of an action it could not refuse 
to perform,’ which would clearly violate NEPA’s ‘rule of reason.’ ”176 
Likewise, NEPA analyses required for BOEM’s approval of an EP 
generally heavily reference previously prepared broad environmental 
analyses that are subject to agency deference177 or issue a “Finding of 
No Significant Impact,” which waives the requirement to prepare an 
environmental analysis.178 Consequently, a comprehensive report that 
analyzes the environmental impact that occurs from exploratory 
172 30 C.F.R. § 250.1918 (2013). 
173 30 C.F.R. § 550.231 (2019). 
174 Alaska Wilderness League, 788 F.3d at 1225. 
175 Id. at 1226 (“BSEE is required to approve an OSRP that meets the statute’s 
requirements, which the agency reasonably interprets to be the checklist of six requirements 
set forth in § 1321(j)(5)(D).”). 
176 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 769 (2004)). 
177 See Oceana v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 37 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (D.D.C. 
2014) (“When an agency is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise, an 
extreme degree of deference to the agency is warranted.”) (quoting Nat’l Comm. for the 
New River v. F.E.R.C., 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Defs. of Wildlife v. Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 684 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The Shell EA ‘tiers’ from 
two prior EIS’s: the 2007 Multisale EIS covering eleven Gulf lease sales in the 2007–2012 
Multisale and the 2009 supplemental EIS for seven remaining lease sales in the 2007–2012 
Multisale.”). 
178 Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding 
BOEM’s Finding of No Significant Impact). 
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drilling is generally not a successful claim for entities opposing federal 
offshore oil and gas projects from occurring. 
C. The Endangered Species Act
The ESA is largely inapplicable at the exploration stage for many of 
the same reasons as NEPA and therefore fails to effectively deter 
offshore oil and gas in the exploration stage. The ESA’s inapplicability 
generally follows the same analysis as NEPA in the exploration stage. 
Consequently, “[e]ven if there is agency ‘action,’ . . . ESA consultation 
is triggered only if ‘there is discretionary Federal involvement or 
control,’ ”179 because “consultation would be merely a ‘meaningless 
exercise’ if the agency lacks the power to implement changes that 
would benefit endangered species.”180 Since approving an Oil Spill 
Contingency plan is a nondiscretionary duty, the ESA requirements do 
not affect the BSEE’s approval of the plan.181 
In addition, the discretion afforded to agencies allows BOEM to rely 
on previous analyses through the tiering framework. In fact, in a 2012 
case, courts upheld BOEM’s EP approval despite the agency’s reliance 
on a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service consultation that BOEM itself 
acknowledged may not be accurate due to the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster and was in the process of being revised.182 Nevertheless, the 
court mentioned that BOEM retains the authority to suspend activities 
upon a finding that the action would jeopardize threatened or 
endangered species.183 
D. The Coastal Zone Management Act
Once the EP is complete, the governor and management agency of 
the affected state receives a copy of the document. Regulations require 
the regional supervisor of the project to consult with the state regarding 
the governor’s comments and concerns with the EP and ensure 
consistency with a federally approved Coastal Management Plan.184 
Though the CZMA consistency provision during the exploration 
stage provides states with some ability to participate in EP 
authorization, it does not allow states to reject plans based on 
179 Alaska Wilderness League, 788 F.3d at 1219 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2012) 
(alteration in original)). 
180 Id. at 1219 (quoting Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
181 Id. 
182 Defs. of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1252. 
183 Id. at 1253. 
184 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
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environmental considerations.185 The consistency provision 
unofficially allows states to negotiate with the lessees to require 
protections beyond what BOEM requires.186 However, such authority 
fails to provide states the ability to block offshore oil and gas 
development.187 
V 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION STAGE 
After the exploration stage, any additional drilling can occur only 
with the submission of a Development and Production Plan (DPP).188 
An operator must submit a DPP for developing OCS resources in 
accordance with a lease in regions where significant development has 
not taken place.189 Though a DPP includes much of the same 
information as an EP, it requires more details regarding the operation 
of the proposed project: (1) current geological and geophysical 
information, (2) environmental safeguards that will be put in place, 
(3) anticipated discharges and disposal plans, assessment of cumulative
environmental impacts, (4) alternatives to the proposed action, (5) an
expected rate of development and production, and (6) a time schedule
for performance.190
A. The Coastal Zone Management Act
In the development and production stage, states are the ultimate 
authority on whether a plan satisfies a consistency review.191 Further, 
if a state determines that a DPP is inconsistent with a coastal zone 
management plan, the only way to appeal the consistency 
determination is through an administrative appeal, where states’ 
determinations are per se valid.192 Though states cannot outrightly ban 
a project from development, they can use the consistency provision to 
185 John K. Van de Kamp & John A. Saurenman, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Leasing: What Role for the States?, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 107 (1990). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 107. 
188 Wiygul, supra note 87, at 129. 
189 Id. 
190 30 C.F.R. § 250.34 (1997); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-91).
191 Wiygul, supra note 87, at 160–61.
192 Id.
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require additional information, impose additional conditions on DPP, 
and slow down the development process.193 
An administrative appeal is available through the Secretary of 
Commerce, which will review the consistency provision or determine 
if inconsistency is necessary in the interest of national security.194 
NOAA regulations have set forth a three-part test to determine if oil 
and gas development is necessary in the interest of national security 
and therefore exempt from the consistency provision, according to the 
following guidelines: 
(a) The activity furthers the national interest as articulated in
§ 302 or § 303 of the Act, in a significant or substantial
manner,
(b) The national interest furthered by the activity outweighs the
activity’s adverse coastal effects, when those effects are
considered separately or cumulatively [, and]
(c) There is no reasonable alternative available [e.g., location,
design, etc.] which would permit the activity to be
conducted in a manner consistent with the enforceable
policies of the management program.195
Critically, as of 2019, federal agencies have never rejected a DPP on 
the basis of environmental harm.196 Nevertheless—and despite any 
direct authority from the CZMA—California, Florida, and Alaska have 
used the consistency provision to impose additional conditions on 
exploration and development plans and slow down the development 
process.197 States have used their authority under the consistency 
provision “to require mitigation measures such as the barging of 
drilling muds to shore, extra precautions against oil spills, and extra 
training for personnel.”198 Despite oil companies’ opposition to the 
states’ ability to condition a consistency determination on additional 
requirements, it is rarely challenged because of the lengthy appeal 
process that can render the project unprofitable. Consequently, the 
consistency provision in the development stage is likely the primary 
193 Id. at 161. 
194 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
195 15 C.F.R. § 930.121 (2020). 
196 See, e.g., California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging 
that DPP activities will affect the natural resources of the coastal zone but enjoins agency 
action on procedural grounds). 
197 Wiygul, supra note 87, at 161–62. 
198 Id. 
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means for coastal states to influence an OCS exploration and 
development operation. 
Despite states’ general lack of ability to deter oil and gas 
development through the CZMA, supporters of offshore oil and gas 
development are looking for further ways to hinder state participation 
in the management of their coasts.199 In June 2018, House Republicans 
prepared a proposal that would impose heavy penalties on states that 
disapprove of drilling offshore in over half of the lease blocks off their 
coasts.200 An Arizona representative characterized the proposal as “a 
ransom note in cheap disguise.”201 However, there has been no further 
discussion indicating a serious intent to proceed with the bill.202 
B. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The required DPP in the development and production phase gives 
states an opportunity to deter offshore oil and gas because the 
documentation is actionable under OCSLA, which imposes specific 
procedures for challenging a DPP. Complaints must be filed in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals in the circuit where the affected state is located.203 
However, no litigation has been filed under OCSLA in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals regarding exploration and development because states seem 
to have more success enforcing their concerns under the CZMA 
consistency determination. 
C. The National Environmental Policy Act
Though opportunities exist for states to indirectly challenge a DPP 
or an EP under NEPA, similar to OCSLA, states rarely pursue a NEPA 
challenge in the exploration and development stage because the CZMA 
consistency process has provided a superior means of deterring 
offshore oil and gas.204 
199 See Dino Grandoni, House Republicans Propose Financial Penalties for States That 
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CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE 
In analyzing state powers to deter federal offshore oil and gas 
projects, several recurring themes become apparent. First, the “tiering 
approach” recommended through OCSLA and the courts renders the 
statutory mechanisms put in place to encourage state participation in 
the development of OCS resources largely symbolic. In the initial 
stages of the process, analyses require little specificity, which 
essentially allows the federal government to have complete control 
over the planning and leasing stages. Indeed, cumulative impacts of the 
analysis are rarely required at the early stages in the process. While 
statutory schemes include avenues for states to voice their concerns, no 
real enforceable powers exist in determining whether an area will be 
leased or not. 
This framework seems structured on the basis that potential 
environmental problems will be addressed at later stages in the process 
when more site-specific analyses are underway. While logical in 
theory, states generally have very little power to enforce their own laws 
and policies at later stages in the process. Though the CZMA 
consistency review gives states some power over operational matters, 
it generally does not allow for states to influence the decision to 
proceed with development. Thus, a Secretary of the Interior should 
satisfy a greater burden in justifying why he or she rejected state 
recommendations earlier in the process. 
Second, the environmental reports under NEPA and OCSLA 
generally analyze costs and benefits to the nation as a whole rather than 
the cost and benefit to coastal states directly affected by the 
development. Moreover, costs are generally difficult to accurately 
predict due to large leasing sizes that inhibit an analysis’s ability to 
analyze the environment in detail. Though the Bush and Obama 
Administrations generally used smaller leasing areas, the statute does 
not mandate the size of the leasing area and the leasing area can 
potentially be expanded again in the Trump Administration. 
Consequently, the analysis of a project’s costs may appear even more 
diluted when compared to the harm suffered to the country as a whole. 
Third, the structure in place does not allow for a prohibition on 
development on the basis of environmental harm. As previously 
mentioned, NEPA is primarily procedural and thus imposes no 
substantive requirements on developers of OCS resources. Further, 
OCSLA imposes a very high standard to enjoin drilling on the basis of 
environmental concerns. Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard 
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should be lowered to give states a greater opportunity to challenge an 
agency decision on the basis of its analysis of environmental harms. 
Despite the statutory scheme’s desperate need for reform, the 
complexity of the offshore oil and gas development process 
compounded with increasing opposition and awareness of climate 
change will likely stall oil and gas operations until a new 
administration. At which point, OCS oil and gas drilling enthusiasm 
can quickly lose the political momentum necessary to proceed. Thus, 
bureaucratic hurdles, state moratoriums, political disfavor, and 
obstructionist litigation will likely be coastal states’ most effective 
strategy for deterring offshore oil and gas until drastic reforms can 
ensure that states’ concerns are adequately considered in the 
development of OCS oil and gas resources. 
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